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The Circassians of Israel: Maintaining 
an Exilic Culture in the Zionist 
Homeland 
Nitin Rao 
In July of 2019, protests broke out in the Israeli village of Kfar Kama, in the Lower Galilee, 
over the anticipated settlement of a non-Circassian couple in the municipality.1 The Circassians are 
an ethnic group of historic origins in the Caucasus mountains some of whose forebears arrived in 
modern-day Israel as refugees amid violent disruptions caused by the expansion of the Russian 
Empire into their ancestral lands during the mid-nineteenth century. In 2019, the Circassians of 
Kfar Kama protested the introduction of non-Circassians into their homogeneous community as the 
beginning of a cultural erosion that could erase their generations-long efforts to maintain their 
identity despite their displacement. As Muslims but not Arabs, Circassians occupy a unique place in 
Israeli society but have often been overlooked because of their exceptionally small numbers; they 
number today no more than four thousand in a country of nine million people. Because of their 
“sympathetic neutrality”2 during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Circassians fared far better from the 
Israelis than the other non-Jewish minorities despite their Islamic faith. These Israeli Circassians 
have weathered seven decades in Israel without becoming either Jews or Arabs and continue to place 
a strong emphasis on Caucasian culture and their native language. Indeed, compared to diaspora 
Circassian communities elsewhere in the Middle East (such as in Turkey and Jordan) and all over 
the world, the Circassians of Israel have been particularly successful in maintaining their traditional 
language, culture, and customs. 
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This paper principally draws on the anthropological literature of Chen Bram, the sociological 
work of Nirit Reichel, and the military history of Randall Geller, as well as primary source news 
articles to trace the history and identity of Circassians in Israel. The first section traces the 
background of Israel’s Circassian community from their roots in the Caucasus through the Ottoman 
Empire to their settlement in the land of Palestine. The second section focuses on the relationship of 
the Circassian community with the Israeli government through the lens of military service, the 
community’s narratives, and the disbursement of national funds to minority communities. The third 
section analyzes how faith and language combined to insulate Circassians from assimilating forces 
and how the community continues to insist on its homogeneity. The fourth section compares the 
Israeli Circassian community to the rest of the Middle Eastern Circassian diaspora. Finally, the paper 
concludes by linking Circassian exilic narratives to the nineteenth-century Zionist project. 
 
Background 
The Circassians are an ethnic group whose ancestors are traced to the region of Circassia in 
the Caucasus, on the northeast coast of the Black Sea. Known in English as “Circassians,” they refer 
to themselves as “Adyghe.” The Circassians incompletely converted to Christianity—retaining 
several pagan elements—between the third and sixth centuries and only adopted Islam through the 
influence of Crimean khans in the eighteenth century.3  In the early nineteenth century—from 1817 
to 1864—Russia fought a protracted war against the tribes and ethnic groups of the Caucasus to 
annex the region to its empire, creating hundreds of thousands to millions of refugees. The ethnic 
Circassians of the region fled across the Black Sea to seek refuge amid their coreligionists in the 
Ottoman Empire. They were pushed out of their homeland in deadly forced migrations that modern 
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Circassian communities now label a genocide.4 The Ottoman government resettled these Circassians 
on the fringes of the empire—particularly in regions wracked by Arab, Kurdish, and Balkan 
separatism—as loyal forces in remote areas.5 Particularly after the loss of most of the Ottoman 
Balkan territories in 1878, the Ottoman government in Istanbul moved Circassian refugees into 
parts of Greater Syria—modern-day Syria, Jordan, and Israel—where Circassian communities still 
exist today. Indeed, it was Circassian refugees who founded Amman, Jordan’s capital.6 Around 1878, 
Circassian refugees founded the town of Kfar Kama in the Lower Galilee, Rehaniya in the Upper 
Galilee near Safed, and Hirbat Circass in the West Bank. The refugees eventually abandoned the 
Hirbat Circass settlement because of malaria, with the result that Kfar Kama (pop. ~3000) and 
Rehaniya (pop. ~1000) remain the only two Circassian communities in Israel today.7 While initially, 
the newly settled Circassians were pastoralists who grazed animals as they had in the Caucasus, 
frequent Bedouin raids encouraged their shift to agriculture.8 The Circassians of the Golan Heights 
also came into conflict with the local Druze through the 1880s and 1890s, intermittently 
skirmishing until a full-scale war broke out in 1895 that required an Ottoman cavalry division to 
join the Circassians and terrorize the Druze into placidity.9  
Circassian settlements remained in what became the British Mandate territory of Palestine 
after World War I and lasted until Israeli independence, even as their inhabitants lived largely as they 
had in the previous three decades. Chen Bram describes that during the late Ottoman period 
through the British Mandate for Palestine (1918-1948) “the major division in the Galilee…[was] 
between sedentary peoples and Bedouin nomads,” and in this atmosphere, “Circassians…easily made 
ties to the Jewish settlers.”10 Randall Geller notes that from the first nearby settlements in 1899 
through independence in 1948, the village of Kfar Kama had friendly relations and frequent social 
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interaction with the surrounding Jewish settlements. Dozens of Circassians of Kfar Kama joined the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) after Israel secured the Lower Galilee in August of 1948. Unlike Kfar 
Kama, residents of the Circassian village of Rehaniya lived in a “basically Arab milieu along the 
Lebanese border,” supported Arab irregulars during skirmishes and unrest in the late British mandate 
period (1918-1948), and primarily11 fought with the Arabs until the village’s capture in late October 
of 1948.  Circassian participation with Zionists in the 1948 war was complicated by contingents of 
Circassian soldiers in Arab countries, principally serving Syria and Jordan.12 Thus, at the dawn of 
Israel’s existence, Circassians found themselves on unsteady ground with their new state: lauded for 
their support but also doubted for their cross-border ties.  
 
Israeli Circassians and the State 
Because of Circassians’ service during the independence war in 1948, the Israeli government 
tended to treat the Circassian minority favorably as a “loyal minority,” often to boost the diverse, 
tolerant, democratic credentials of the state. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, claimed 
in 1949 that “In this country there are minorities that are above all suspicion and it is possible to 
trust them, more or less, like the Circassians and the Druze,”13 as opposed to Christian and Muslim 
Arabs. The office of the Custodian for Abandoned Property intended to seize abandoned property in 
Kfar Kama and Rehaniya after the 1948 war. However, the commander of the Minorities Unit in 
which Circassians served intervened on their behalf to stop the seizure, citing their reliability as 
soldiers and the critical need for their political support.14 Clearly, the early favorable treatment that 
Circassians received from Israel was both a reward for service rendered as well as insurance for future 
support. Rehaniya actually continued to be a hotbed of smuggling and foreign espionage through 
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1955. It was only through the high-profile intercession of the Kfar Kama community—some of 
whose inhabitants threatened to emigrate to Turkey—that a plan to transfer Rehaniya’s population 
to Kfar Kama was shelved.15  
In part due to the intransigence of Rehaniya, it took ten years before Circassians were 
included in the mandatory draft into the IDF in 1958—two years after the Druze community. 
Though initially, they served in minority-exclusive units, the IDF integrated Circassians into Jewish 
units by 1962.16 In falling under the IDF draft, Circassians became the first Muslims to serve 
regularly under the Israeli flag, allowing the Israeli government to prove that it was not intrinsically 
discriminatory towards Muslims, thereby helping to justify its policies towards restive Palestinian 
Arab Muslims. Geller makes the additional interesting argument that in treating Circassians above 
other Israeli minorities, the Israeli government hoped to engender the goodwill of highly placed 
Circassians in neighboring states like Jordan.17  
Intriguingly, contemporary Israeli Circassians tend to play up their pro-Jewish role during 
the mandate period, likely as a tactic—conscious or otherwise—of integrating their own 
community’s history into the Jewish-Zionist narrative of Israel. Israeli Circassian Khoon Shawki, a 
proprietor of Kfar Kama’s Circassian Museum, noted in a 2012 interview that “there was no 
Ministry of Immigrant Absorption back then. It was the Circassians who took in those 
immigrants.”18 While the Circassians of Kfar Kama may have had good relations with surrounding 
Jewish settlements, Shawki’s claim that Circassians “took in those immigrants” is certainly a stretch 
in light of the historical record.  That is, Circassians might have co-existed peacefully and 
prosperously alongside Jewish settlements, but the Jewish Agency and similar Zionist organizations 
did the lion’s share of provisioning and sustaining the immigrants.  
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Similarly, Kfar Kama elementary school principal Adam Jarhad asserted that “the Circassians 
defended the Jews” during the Arab revolts of the 1930s.19 This assertion is far more grounded in 
fact than Shawki’s hyperbolic assertion and reflects the pride in which Circassians hold their 
ancestors’ contribution to the Zionist project. While these themes of support for Israel and Yishuv 
Jews are broadly accurate in reference to the history of Kfar Kama, the struggle to pacify Rehaniya 
demonstrates that Circassians, in general, were not unreservedly pro-Jewish during the struggle for 
independence. In stressing the elements that illustrate their part in the “brave defense” of the land 
from Arab invasion during Israel’s birth, Circassians have been trying to build a space for themselves 
in the Israeli mythos, trying to prove that they are as Israeli as any Israeli Jew. 
 In 1950, Kfar Kama became the first non-Jewish village to receive the designation of “local 
council,” beginning municipal democracy decades before martial law was lifted from Arab towns. 
The autonomy and central financial infusions that accompanied local council status allowed the 
Circassian community (and the Druze) to electrify and develop far more rapidly than the Arabs. 
However, when Arab villages strengthened their position through political mobilization in the 1980s 
and 1990s, Circassians began to feel an acute lack of influence with the government and their 
resulting inferiority compared to the Jewish sector.20  These feelings strengthened a Circassian 
perception of having second-class citizenship. 
The Circassian community experienced an emotional blow as well amidst the high-profile 
case of Izzat Nafsu, and this blow shook the community’s sense of Israeli belonging. In 1980, a 
military tribunal sentenced the Circassian IDF intelligence officer Nafsu to eighteen years in prison 
on charges of espionage and treason against Israel during his service in the Lebanon War. After 
seven-and-a-half years in prison, the Israeli Supreme Court acquitted him after revelations that the 
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Shin Bet—Israel’s internal security service—had perjured itself and tortured Nafsu to extract a false 
confession.21 According to Bram, “this case generated heightened consciousness concerning the 
community’s need to organize itself.”22  
In 2009, the Forum of Druze and Circassians in Israel staged a month-long protest over the 
lack of state funding to their communities after the national water company cut off the tap for a 
handful of indebted Druze villages. The Netanyahu government agreed in 2011 to provide 680 
million shekels in funding to the Druze and Circassian communities and tripled the funding to over 
two billion shekels in 2015.23 Though Druze leaders fronted the protests—and led a community 
dozens of times larger than the four-thousand-strong Circassian community in Israel—the protests 
indicate a quasi-political reawakening in the Circassian community after decades of stagnation. 
Indeed, the thrust of the Druze-Circassian grievance related to unequal funding compared to Arab 
and Haredi communities, not uncoincidentally communities which began to flex political strength 
in the 1980s and 1990s.24 The story of the Circassians vis-à-vis the Israeli government, then, is one 
of reward and mutual support in the early decades, followed by inattentive neglect, and now 
reassertion of equal rights—though largely in tandem with the more numerous Druze.  
 
Anti-Assimilation and Arab-Circassian Relations  
Though Israeli Circassians practice Sunni Islam like most Israeli Arabs, their shared faith 
does not unite them with Arab Muslims to any significant degree. Indeed, Circassians are most often 
grouped with Israeli Druze, as seen in their joint protests led by the Forum of Druze and Circassians 
in Israel. Circassian Islam has a unique flavor, in part because of their relatively late adoption of 
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Islam—which occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries—and in part because of the coexistence of 
traditional Circassian codes and norms alongside Islamic codes and norms. The Adyghe Habze, the 
ancestral code of conduct of Circassian society, reflects the clan-based honor system by which the 
Circassian pastoralists of the Caucasus lived until their expulsion by the Russians, and was carried 
with the Circassian refugees to their exile in the Ottoman Empire.25 Israeli Circassians actually 
privilege Islamic law over the Habze, unlike Circassian communities in Syria and Jordan—which 
Chen Bram traces back as a technique to reconcile cultural differences between the Circassians of the 
Shapsough tribe (who populate Kfar Kama) and the Abzakh tribe (who populate Rehaniya). 
However, the Israeli Circassian concept of umma—in traditional Islam, the global Muslim 
community—refers exclusively to their villages of Kfar Kama and Rehaniya.26 This act of cordoning 
off themselves from other Israeli Muslim communities has assisted the Circassians in maintaining the 
relatively strict endogamy on which their current cultural strength and lack of assimilation has relied. 
There has not been total isolation; however: Bram notes that, in the 1980s, the young Circassians 
who mounted an Islamic revivalist challenge to the traditional clan-based political order that 
dominated Kfar Kama’s local council formed their ideological roots at an Islamic college in the Arab-
dominated “Triangle” region of Israel.27 The success of their political challenge indicates that 
Circassian Islam is both an important part of Circassian life and also not completely divorced from 
Palestinian Islam, which imparted the activist-revivalist underpinnings to the Circassian political 
challengers. 
 The Circassians’ distinctive educational system has also helped to sustain a strong Circassian 
identity and while enabling members to advance Circassian interests. In the late Ottoman era Arabic 
and Turkish became the languages of instruction in a syllabus primarily centered on literacy and 
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religion. Circassian was only used insofar as students needed Arabic and Turkish lessons translated 
into Circassian until they developed fluency. Under the British mandate, the authorities replaced 
Turkish with English and added secular subjects to the curriculum. During the Israeli era, Circassian 
teachers gradually began to replace Arabs on the school staff. They added Hebrew to the curriculum 
of Arabic, English, secular subjects, and Quranic studies with Arabic as the language of instruction. 
Until the 1950s and 1960s, the community had no contact with the broader Circassian diaspora and 
little sense of Circassian history and literature outside folk traditions. It was not until 1976 that the 
Circassian language was added to the curriculum—before then it had only been the spoken 
vernacular—and only then because an American expert by the name of Johann Catford had arrived 
to teach the elders of the village the Russian Cyrillic-derived Circassian script for the first time. 
Additionally, in 1976, the government removed Circassian education from the Department of Arab 
Affairs, and the Circassian community agreed to change the language of instruction from Arabic to 
Hebrew in 1978.28 That same year, the community added the study of Circassian culture and 
traditions to the curriculum. Nirit Reichel argues that the government sponsored this strengthening 
of “Circassianism” at the expense of Arabic to weaken the bridges between the Circassian 
community and the Arab sector.29 To this day, Circassian children study an astonishing four 
languages—Hebrew, Arabic, English, and Circassian—in school, go off to university equipped with 
these languages of the nation, religion, globe, and the home, and then return to their villages. The 
project of Circassian education has both advanced critical skills for Circassians to function in the 
Israeli economy and also strengthened their sense of Circassian identity amidst the pressure to choose 
between Hebrew and Arabic. 
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 Despite a successful history of maintaining Circassian identity, the community’s insecurity 
over demographic assimilation or fusion is apparent. As related at the beginning of this article, in 
July of 2019, news broke that “a non-Circassian married couple”—one of whom was Arab—had 
won a government tender to build a home in Kfar Kama, causing Kfar Kama’s mayor to express to 
his constituents that he would act “to preserve the community’s ‘Circassian character.’”30 Circassian 
petitioners explicitly stated their insecurity, writing that “if we don’t wake up, there will be 
additional cases, and in a few years, the village will lose its Circassian identity.”31 Protesters waved 
signs expressing similar sentiments such as “we’re not against anyone, we just want to preserve our 
Circassian identity.”32 Despite seven decades of successful cultural preservation in Kfar Kama and 
Rehaniya, it seems the Circassian community feels that it will only take one domino to start the 
cascade that eradicates Circassian culture. A deputy attorney general for the government ruled in 
favor of the non-Circassian couple at the request of the Arab party Balad’s Member of the Knesset 
(MK) Hiba Yazbek, who framed the situation as a local mayor acting “in a discriminatory and racist 
manner towards Arabs.”33 Even the Haaretz headline first breaking the news reads “Galilee Mayor 
Objects to Arab Joining Town, Vows to Keep its ‘Circassian Character’” (emphasis added).34 Despite 
the Circassians’ clear expression that they had no ill will towards any ethnic or religious group, 
merely a desire to maintain the homogeneity of their town—“we’re not against anyone, we just want 
to preserve our Circassian identity”—both an Arab politician and a mainstream Jewish newspaper 
portrayed the issue as one of discrimination against Arabs in particular, ignoring that one member of 
the couple was not Arab. Perhaps that development signifies a perception of Jewish-Circassian 
equality—that is, if Circassians are capable of discriminating against Arabs like Jews are then 
Circassians are on a higher footing than Arabs, perhaps even on an equal footing with Jews in the 
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view of the Arab MK. Or, perhaps the pluralist Israeli left does not and will not tolerate segregated 
multiculturalism, portending an end to the distinct Circassian identity if those values ever dominate 
the mainstream. 
 
The Middle Eastern Circassian Diaspora 
In Syria and Jordan, Circassians have proven themselves as formidable martial communities 
and have integrated themselves into the military-political power structures, albeit at the expense of 
their distinct culture and community. In Syria, French mandate (1920-1943) authorities and later 
Arab nationalists suppressed Circassian concerns and aspirations, though Circassians continued to be 
overrepresented in the military and other security institutions. Many Syrian Circassians came from 
the Golan Heights, so that community suffered particularly after Israel’s seizure of the Heights 
during the Six Day War. This devastation dissolved one of Syria’s largest Circassian communities 
and precipitated an exodus to places like Damascus, Europe, and the United States, with many of 
these emigrants and refugees later losing the cohesive Circassian community of their fathers and 
grandfathers.35 In Jordan, Circassian refugees founded the modern capital of Amman and profited 
from the Ottoman Sultan’s construction of the Hejaz Railway, which aimed to facilitate and protect 
the passage to and from Mecca for Muslim pilgrims. Though they were fervently loyal supporters of 
the Turks during World War I, the Circassian community of the new British Mandate for 
Transjordan threw their support behind Britain’s chosen ruler, Emir Abdullah, and supplied the 
men for his royal guard. To this day, Circassian soldiers in their distinct bandolier-strapped, thick 
woolen suits and fur hats protect the King of Jordan. Jordan’s political organization and land 
reforms privileged the Circassian community with legislative overrepresentation and title to their 
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Ottoman-era lands, transforming Jordan’s Circassian community into a wealthy landed class. As a 
result of their integration into the Jordanian high class, many Jordanian Circassians no longer speak 
Circassian and have assimilated into Arabic-speaking communities.36 Living among other Muslims in 
a basically similar Arab milieu as their Ottoman-era ancestors, the Circassians of the Arab lands have 
been less successful than their Israeli counterparts stopping assimilation. In a way, living in the 
Jewish state has assisted Circassians in preserving their culture because unlike their kin who 
assimilated into the Arab Muslim mainstream of surrounding states, Israeli Circassians had little to 
no chance of assimilating into the Zionist Jewish mainstream. 
The ‘Turkification of post-independence Turkey eroded the distinct culture of the Circassian 
Turkish minority, who were forced to suppress their traditions and language. After World War I, the 
Turkish nationalist government under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk closed all Circassian schools and 
newspapers prosecuted Circassian parents who did not give their children Turkish names and exiled 
prominent Circassians like Çerkes Ethem.37 Persecuted for any expression of non-Turkish identity, 
most Circassians lost their language and “became” Turks. Of the five million citizens of Circassian 
descent in Turkey, only two million identify themselves as “Circassian,” and fewer than one million 
can speak the language.38 Indeed, a 1972 Jerusalem Post article discusses the return of a handful of 
Circassian families. They had left Israel for Turkey in the mid-1950s only to be disappointed by the 
quality of life for Circassians in Turkey.39 Despite these developments, during the 1970s a Circassian 
revival occurred, with some activists—termed Dönüşçü (returnists)—seeking to repatriate to their 
traditional homeland in the North Caucasus. However, the 1980 Turkish military coup suppressed 
ethnic aspirations and organizations soon after. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many obstacles to 
cross-Black Sea transportation and communication lifted, and Turkish Circassians either returned to 
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extant Caucasian Circassian communities in small numbers or established regular contact with the 
community in their homeland.40 This awakening in Turkey reflects a larger interest among 
Circassians in their global kin.  
In 1991, meanwhile, Israeli Circassians organized a delegation to the first Circassian national 
congress in the Caucusus.41 Izzat Nafsu—the falsely convicted IDF soldier—recounted that on a 
2016 vacation to Turkey, a Circassian taxi driver inquired about the story of Nafsu on realizing that 
his passengers were Israeli and “[nearly fell] out of the taxi” after Nafsu replied that he was Izzat 
Nafsu.42 From the IDF’s early mid-century attempts to secure the goodwill of Jordanian Circassians 
by treating Israeli Circassians well to Nafsu’s 21st-century vacation, Circassians have continued to be 
invested in the well-being of their brethren across borders. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite their small size and isolation, the Circassian community in Israel has managed to 
retain its traditions, language, and culture after seven decades of Israeli rule in the Galilee and seven 
previously under the Ottomans and British. In many ways, living in the Jewish nation-state has 
conferred anti-assimilative advantages on the Circassians of Kfar Kama, and Rehaniya, who have not 
been pressured into becoming Jews like their Turkish and Arab brethren have become Turks and 
Arabs because of the basic incongruity in religion and the character of state. The irony for Israel’s 
Circassians is their own exilic status in a country very literally founded to give a home to exiles. 
Having grown up in a country that represents the fulfillment of the Zionist project, some Israeli 
Circassians now express a desire for a Circassian state to which the international Circassian diaspora 
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can return. Even Circassians who do not intend for them or their descendants to return to Circassia 
speak fondly of their homeland despite the circumstances in which their ancestors left, often treating 
it in terms that evoke a mythic promised land of milk and honey.43 In the present, the limited goal of 
genocide recognition has wide currency among Circassians: about one hundred Israeli Circassians 
protested in 2014 in front of the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv to demonstrate their opposition to the 
erasure of their culture in Sochi—the historical capital of Circassia—during the Winter Olympics 
there.44 After one hundred fifty years of Russian and Soviet cultural erasure, however, Kfar Kama 
and Rehaniya may well be more “Circassian” than present-day Circassia itself. Though the recent 
Kfar Kama protests portend poorly, Circassians in Israel have had one hundred and forty years of 
success in preserving their unique culture.  They will continue to do so because their corner of the 
Galilee has become as much of a realized homeland to the small community as their traditional 
homeland in the Caucasus. 
 
Nitin Rao is a Senior from Northern Virginia majoring in International Relations and Modern Middle 
Eastern Studies. A student of British history, he fervently hopes to one day be a Victorian aristocrat.  
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